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Abstract 
The pace and incidence of improvements to oceanic travel conditions for American immigrants, during 
the quarter century preceeding the First World War, were significantly constrained by shipping lines’ 
capacity considerations. The improvements had no detectable impact on the overall volume of 
migration, but did influence the flow by route and, probably, the frequency of repeat crossings. Data 
gathered from transatlantic shipping sources quantify the evolution of travel accommodations for 
migrants, as “closed berth” cabins, for two to eight passengers each, slowly supplanted older and less 
comfortable “open-berth” dormitory style quarters. By 1900, roughly 20% of North Atlantic second and 
steerage (third) class passenger capacity was in closed berths; by 1914, 35%. Steerage alone went from 
about 10% to 24% closed berths. Accommodation of migrants in closed berths came sooner for 
northern Europe routes and later for the southern. Prior suggestions attributing the pace of the 
conversion to competitive impediments, and to discrimination against southern European passengers, 
are not corroborated. Closed berths for migrants came gradually to all routes regardless of shifting cartel 
effectiveness, passenger cartels enhanced non-price competition (e.g. in on-board conditions) and 
differentiation was much more by travel route than by passenger ethnicity. Instead, closed berths were 
significantly related to the incidence of tourist traffic (highest for north Europe, and seasonally 
somewhat opposite to migration) because capacity utilization could be raised by using the same quarters 
for tourists and migrants, provided that the thus interchanged units were closed berth cabins. Growing 
rates of repeat migration seem to have been mostly a (further contributing) cause, but also partly an 
effect, of conversion from open to closed berths. Travel condition improvements on North Pacific 
migration routes lagged the North Atlantic, possibly due to the Pacific’s lower percentage of seasonally 
offsetting tourism, its less-concentrated migrant flows, and its smaller ships with lower scale economies. 
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Introduction: Transportation developments, travel conditions and mass migration 
 
 This essay addresses the causes and effects of travel conditions experienced by overseas 
migrants journeying to and from the United States between 1890 and 1914, and the changes in 
those travel conditions over this period. Half of all voluntary immigrants to North America 
before 1914 came over the course of those two and a half decades, arriving from all over 
Europe, and in considerably smaller but significantly evolving numbers from non-European 
sources as well. In the overall life-cycle of adjustment to a new life in a far-off land, the physical 
intercontinental relocation was a temporary hiccup, and is seldom focused on at length by 
historians. The oceanic crossing to America was nonetheless an important common 
denominator experience shared across an unusually long-lasting and ethnically diverse flow of 
many millions of people.1 
 The nineteenth century transportation revolution that is commonly and logically 
associated with powerful and sustained growth in global long distance goods trade, had more 
modest though still noteworthy impacts on long distance passenger movements.2 Across the 
North Atlantic core of the burgeoning belle epoch global economy, some fourteen million migrants 
from a labor-supplying Old World took advantage of generally safe, reliable and regular oceanic 
transit links, during the years 1890-1914, in order to pursue economic opportunities in an 
industrializing United States. This relocation was undoubtedly assisted by the then newly 
extended network of railways connecting remoter regions of inland Europe to its Atlantic ports, 
although it is not easy to isolate this travel facilitation from other factors, notably the 
liberalization of border controls within Europe, and the tremendous growth of short term, low-
skilled industrial and urban employment in America which enabled a long distance mass 
migration overwhelmingly self-financed and self-insured through family networks.3 
 Historians have been rather more skeptical about the degree to which oceanic transport 
improvements facilitated mass migration to North America in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Across the Pacific, restrictive regulations impeded the growth of relocation 
from Asia to America regardless of travel conditions. Transatlantic movers faced fewer legal 
barriers, but their long term volume grew in line with, not faster than, the development of the 
U.S. economy. Arguably, the single most significant improvement to pre-First World War 
transatlantic travel conditions came with the conversion of the migrant trade from sailing ships 
to steamships during the 1850s and 1860s, which cut travel times by up to two-thirds, yet 
immigration from Europe to America in the early 1870s boom years (almost all by steam) was 
less in absolute terms than it had been in the early 1850s (almost all by sail), and relative to 
population levels markedly lower. Furthermore, though travel conditions upon the mid-19th 
century Atlantic crossing were often harsh, and at times brutal and exploitative, recent historical 
research indicates that the actual risks of death or severe injury to health (e.g. from disease 
enroute or shipwreck) were not as high as popular belief since then often implies. The 
                                                
1 Keeling, “Repeat,” p. 164, Keeling, “Capacity,” pp. 267-68. 
2 Keeling, Transportation Revolution, pp. 40-44. 
3 Taylor, pp. 167-209, Keeling, “Networks,” pp. 141-43, Historical Statistics of the United States, p. 1-547.  
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subsequent improvement resulting from conversion to steamships, though significant, did not 
have the decisive effects on migration volumes that are sometimes supposed.4 
Improvements to transatlantic travel conditions after 1890 arguably had even less impact 
upon migration volumes than the earlier sail-to-steam conversion did. Migrant travellers 
benefitted as Atlantic steamships became larger, roomier, and less uncomfortable between 1890 
and 1914, but not because disease outbreaks, travel times,5 or ticket prices declined. Already by 
the 1880s, there was a higher average risk of dying by staying in Europe than by emigrating to 
America, and the average passage price had become equivalent to only about a month’s unskilled 
wages in the United States. The basic economic incentives for migration changed little after 
1900. As Figure 1 shows, the wage-adjusted average steerage fare in 1913 was almost exactly 
what it had been in 1900.6 A closer look at travel conditions, and the causes and effects of their 
changes over time, can however add specificity and qualification to these general impressions. 
 
    Figure 1    Increasing fuel efficiency, increasing space 
        per passenger, no lasting trend in fares, 1901-13 
 
 
 
Sourc e s and Not es :  The figure covers voyages between Europe and the four largest U.S. ports (New 
York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore; see also notes to Figure 2 in the appendix). Size or space (gross tons) 
from Bonsor, coal requirements based on seventy-six vessels in J.H. Isherwood (Sea Breezes and Steamers of 
the Past) which carried 35 percent of all second-class and steerage passengers during these years, passenger 
berths (here, first class, second class, and steerage all combined together) from PCR. Fares are steerage 
westbound (from Keeling, “Capacity,” p. 228) discounted by changes in the average U.S. unskilled wage 
(from http://www.measuringworth.com/). Second-class fares were higher but closely correlated with those 
of steerage. (see Keeling, “Transportation Revolution,” p. 56). Deck plans indicate that space per passenger 
increased over time for all classes of travel. See also Keeling, “Abstracts,” pp. 21-22. 
                                                
4 Barde, pp. 80, 133-34, Takaki, pp. 194, 255, Cohn, pp. 125-54, Killick, p. 76, Keeling, “Capacity,” pp. 267-68. 
5 To New York, the average Atlantic transit time dropped by only about half a day (from 11 to 10½ days) between 
1890 and 1900, and then remained essentially unchanged up to 1914. See following footnote for sources. 
6 Re death rates, see Moltmann, “Steamship Transport,” p. 312, and Reports of the U.S. Immigration Commission, 
chaired by Senator William Dillingham, 1911 [Dillingham Report] vol. 37, p. 12. Wage equivalent fares per Keeling, 
“Capacity,” pp. 227-28, 250 n. 16, transit times derived from vessel speeds of Bonsor, weighted before 1899 by 
vessel schedules of Morton Allan, thereafter by passenger volumes of PCR (see Table 1, source), divided by the 
route distances of ARCN, 1900, pp. 312-17, and double-checked against newspaper and other shipping logs. 
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Migration and travel conditions across the North Atlantic after 1890 
 
Transoceanic mass migration to and from and to the United States during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was a major demographic phenomenon carried out by a complex 
transnational travel business.7 Comprehensive shipping line records available from 1898 on 
document the associated substantial and notably cyclical passenger flows to and from major U.S. 
Atlantic ports: 8 
 
 Table 1:  2nd and 3rd Class traffic between Europe and New York 
        Boston, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, 1898-1914  (in '000s)   
         
  Westward Eastward  Westward Eastward 
          1898  c. 300  c. 155   1907  1,378  626   
 1899  411  160   1908  484  626   
 1900  533  209   1909  1,036  700   
 1901  578  186   1910  1,103  349   
 1902  778  227   1911  806  441   
 1903  907  306   1912  1,061  551   
 1904  796  419   1913  1,378  526   
 1905  1,037  301   1914  705  500   
 1906  1,251  402        
          Totals,  1898-1914:    14,542  6,561   
    Not e:  As used here throughout, “3rd Class” is synonymous with “steerage.”  
    Sourc e : Transatlantic Passenger Conference reports, “Trans-Atlantic Passenger  
 Movements” [hereafter PCR] New York, 1899-1914.  
 
Over the quarter century following 1890, transatlantic passenger steamships became 
cheaper to operate due to deployment of more-efficient engines requiring less coal, and these 
efficiencies were passed on to the traveling public not by way of lower fares, but through more 
space per passenger. A range of evidence indicates that this additional space was used to help 
reduce the discomforts of the oceanic traverse for all categories of travellers, including migrants.9 
Qualitative descriptions are an insufficient source for such analysis, however. 
 Surviving first-hand accounts by transatlantic travellers are like fragments of a great 
mosaic encompassing the frightening and the exhilarating, the tedious and the amusing, the 
                                                
7 Nugent, pp. 27-37, Keeling, “Cartels,” pp. 195-96, Keeling, “Patterns,” pp. 281-82, Coleman, pp. 22-60. 
8 U.S. Bureau of Immigration (BI) data provide a similar but less complete picture because they omit passengers in 
the second class before 1903, most westbound repeat migrants after 1905, and all eastbound migrants before 1908, 
and are furthermore mostly available on only an annual basis, whereas the shipping records have subtotals for each 
voyage. The flows in Table 1 amounted to about 80 percent of all migration between Europe and North America 
(including Central America and the Caribbean islands) in the 1898 to 1914 period. See Keeling, “Repeat,” pp. 165-
69, 184, Nugent, p. 14, and Willcox and Ferenczi, vol. 1, pp. 167, 364-65, 501-73. 
9 Keeling, “Capacity,” pp. 42, 45-50, Maxtone-Graham, pp. 5-6, 28-30. 
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unbearable and the pleasant. Passengers’ ratings of the accommodations ranged from fair to 
atrocious, the food from tasty to inedible, the crews from helpful to brutish.  
 Traversing the Atlantic aboard White Star’s Majestic in 1890, Swedish emigrant Gustaf 
Erickson complained about tea that was some kind of bad-tasting “dishwater.” Mary Antin 
wrote about a rough night in 1894 when her ship from Hamburg “pitched and rolled so that 
people were thrown from their berths.” Samuel Chotzinoff’s 1906 crossing on the American 
Line’s St. Paul was “smooth and pleasant.” In a 1907 letter to relatives back in Holland, Anna 
Kuijt said she had been “sick for the five days before landing because we had such bad weather 
and that was not very nice.” Writing in 1906, based on observations from some years earlier, 
Edward Steiner variously decried the steerage of unbearable air, “miserable” food, and violations 
of privacy amongst passengers “packed like a cattle” in a travel class that “ought to be 
condemned as unfit for the transportation of human beings,” while also noting the hours of 
dancing and multilingual amusement among migrants entering into a “larger fellowship than they 
ever enjoyed.” The diary of Marius Larsen, crossing in 1912 from Denmark, on the 
Scandinavian-American Line’s Hellig Olav, described shipboard service “far above my 
expectations” and “fun and merriment” day after day.10 
 The recollected experience of crossing the Atlantic depended on the shipping line, the 
route, the vessel, the crew, the fellow passengers, the time of year, the weather, the age of 
traveller, and how far back into the past the memories lay. Patterns can be discerned across 
eclectic portrayals and ad-hoc reminiscences, notably the salient role of weather (the North 
Atlantic is a stormy sea, and fine weather generally made for an agreeable journey, while bad 
weather meant seasickness, misery and outrageous stench), but to more systematically assess the 
quality of the services dispensed by the shipping firms, and how they were experienced by 
migrants, more tangible and consistent metrics are called for.  
 
 
Gauging the improvements on the North Atlantic: the incidence of closed berths 
 
Between 1890 and 1914, roughly fourteen million European migrants made twenty four million 
Atlantic crossings to and from the United States. During this twenty five year period, 
approximately 87 percent travelled in steerage or third class (sometimes called “ ’tweendeck”), 12 
percent in second class, and less than 1 percent in first class. Most first class passengers were 
U.S. tourists making summer visits to Europe.11
 
By contrast, 95 percent of passengers in second 
class and steerage were European migrants.12 
                                                
10 Barton, p. 213, Antin, p. 178, Chotzinoff, p. 57, Brinks, p. 444, Steiner, pp. 35-36, 42-43, Larsen, pp. 6, 11. See 
also Howe, pp. 39-42, Baines, p. 19. 
11 Approximately seven million crossings east and three million west were made by European migrants who had 
previously made an (initial) westward crossing. (The 14.5 million westward total for 1898-1914 in Table 1 counts 
crossings, not people). Measurements in this paragraph are derived from calculations underlying the appendices in 
Keeling, “Repeat,” pp. 176-78, 184, PCR data, and Keeling, “Transportation Revolution,” pp. 56-57. As a share of 
total passenger volume, second class rose from about 10 percent in 1890 to about 15 percent in 1914. Migrants in 
second class were about 7 percent of all migrants in 1890. By 1914 this proportion had grown to about 17 percent.  
12 Keeling, “1908,” p. 247. 
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 An in-depth study of migrants’ Atlantic travel conditions was conducted in 1908 for the 
Immigration Commission of the U.S. Congress. The Commission’s undercover investigators 
documented observations made of steerage quarters on twelve voyages. In its resulting report, 
the Commission concluded that “disgusting, demoralizing” and “revolting” conditions generally 
prevailed in transatlantic steerage. A newer type of steerage, quite “unobjectionable,” could be 
found on some vessels of “lines carrying emigrants from the North of Europe,” but such 
emigrants were a relatively small percentage of the total flow to the United States. The report 
attributed the introduction of “new steerage” to “competition,” and its limited extent to the 
shipping industry’s market-carving agreements which lessened such competition. The 
coexistence of “both unobjectionable and revolting” conditions, sometimes even occurring 
simultaneously in different sections of the same vessel, was mentioned in support of the 
proposition that legislation could “complete what competition began” and lead to the “better 
type of steerage” becoming “general instead of exceptional.”13  
In broad terms, these findings are consistent with other evidence, and the supposition 
that stricter regulation could have forced additional improvements is certainly persuasive. The 
report, however, lacks a convincing explanation for the actual improvements that did occur. For 
example, why competition should lead to a rising quality of service on the northern but not the 
southern routes from Europe was not addressed (see, however, the next section here below). 
This report is also incomplete because it failed to note that vessels from northern European 
ports also carried substantial numbers of transit migrants from southern and eastern Europe.14 
Subsequent histories have elaborated upon these Commission findings, but provided few 
specifics as to how and why shipboard amenities varied over time and by travel route. 
Within his definitive general history of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century European 
relocation to America, Philip Taylor used vessel deck plans to help put the Immigration 
Commission’s report on steerage conditions into historical context. Around 1890, enclosed 
cabins for two to eight migrants began to augment the older dormitory or “open-berth” 
compartments housing a hundred or more per large room. While the type and size of the beds 
(usually simple metal bunks) were generally the same as in “open-berth” quarters, the more 
modern “closed-berth” arrangements offered passengers greater privacy, and were typically 
supplemented by much more public space (washrooms, toilets, dining rooms, lounges, 
promenade decks) than before. On ships containing steerage with both open and closed berths, 
the latter was often more advantageously situated on the vessel (e.g., higher up and more toward 
the exterior, in better-ventilated sections) than was the former. In closed-berth steerage (new 
steerage), passengers typically received a level of service (crew attention, quality of food, bedding, 
ventilation, etc.) more closely resembling second-class accommodations than open-berth 
steerage (old steerage). Contrary to Taylor’s belief, however, that “there is no way of estimating 
the proportion of emigrants who travelled under the two main sets of conditions,” early 
                                                
13 Dillingham Report, vol. 37, pp. 1-51. Quoted passages are from pp. 6, 10.  
14 Most notable examples were Russian Jews going to America by way of British, rather than continental Europe, 
ports, and Italians embarking from French ports; see Murken, pp. 210-11, 288, 364-5, Evans, p. 59, Barbance, pp. 
156-9, BI Conditions, pp. 21, 63 (chap. 1 subchap. 3, and chap. 3 subchap. 1). 
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twentieth-century transatlantic migration was heavily documented, and records enabling reliable 
approximations do exist.15 
Passenger shipping conferences (cartels) kept consistent, comprehensive and accurate 
records of North Atlantic voyages and passenger totals, eastbound and westbound. Maritime 
chroniclers (e.g., Bonsor) have since compiled passenger capacity figures (first, second, steerage) 
for the ships. Press articles, deck plans, and other sources recorded the proportions within 
steerage that were open berth and closed berth for vessels accounting for a third of all voyages, 
capacity deployed, and passengers carried (Table 3 in the appendix). Given the extensive degree 
of standardization in the industry, this is a sufficiently large sample for estimating the overall 
trend. Figure 2, in the appendix, shows the resulting measurement of closed berths.16  
Closed berths were most prevalent on ships servicing British ports, and least common on 
ships connecting to Mediterranean ports. Vessels on other routes (North Continental and 
Scandinavian) were in between these two extremes. The 1899-1914 period averages ranged from 
50 percent closed berths on U.K. port ships to 25 percent for North Continental plus 
Scandinavia, and 11 percent for the Mediterranean. Second class, sometimes called intermediate 
or second cabin, was (by virtue of being cabin) made up entirely of closed-berth rooms. Second-
class capacity, expressed as a percentage of second class and steerage, varied by European 
embarkation region (although less dramatically than did closed-berth steerage): for vessels from 
and to U.K. ports, the 1899-1914 average was 17 percent, for their North Continental 
counterparts 12 percent, and for the Mediterranean routes 5 percent. Total closed berths available 
to migrants, as a percentage of the sum of all second and steerage berths, is thus derived by 
adding the second-class figures (known for all vessels) to the closed-berth steerage numbers and 
estimates. The year-by-year development, and sources for these data, are shown in Figure 2 in 
the appendix. The percentage of migrants traveling in closed berths (second class and new 
steerage) rose over time on all the major routes, and nearly doubled from 18 percent in 1899 to 
35 percent in 1914. It remains then to discuss the likely causes and effects of this limited yet 
significant improvement in travel conditions. 
 
 
Reasons for the transatlantic travel improvements 
 
Although very uncomfortable by twenty-first-century travel standards, conditions for low-budget 
travellers on transatlantic vessels between 1890 and 1914 were validly considered, then and since, 
to be considerably ameliorated compared to those aboard sailing ships a half century earlier. 
Most immigrants, focused on establishing new lives in America, devoted little comment 
                                                
15 Taylor, p. 164. 
16 The PCR passenger totals are almost identical to those given in the BI passenger lists (U.S. National Archives: 
microfilmed passenger lists of arriving vessels). Bonsor’s two thousand-page catalogue is quite comprehensive. As a 
makeshift adherence to rules requiring separate areas for single women and families, a few vessels had dormitory-
style steerage temporarily partitioned into smaller enclosures; see BI Conditions, p. 132 (Red Star Line), Dillingham 
Report vol. 37, pp. 10-11, McCart, p. 47; such accommodations were closer to old steerage than to new steerage, 
and are not considered as closed berth in the calculations for Figure 2 (Appendix). Based on the New York vessel 
arrivals listed in Morton Allan, the trends of Figure 2 can be approximately extrapolated back to 1890. 
 8 
afterwards to the one to two weeks spent on the Atlantic, but periodic complaints nonetheless 
helped motivate governmental regulation of oceanic travel conditions. Minimum requirements as 
to onboard space and services were also supported by those who hoped that such stipulations 
would reduce immigrant numbers by raising the cost of travel.17 
 The main operative act of the U.S. government in this period was the 1882 Passenger 
Act. “Honored in breach” as one historian put it, this act evidently had little effect either upon 
transatlantic travel conditions or the numbers of people migrating. Dining facilities for open-
berth steerage passengers remained, for example, notably inadequate. The typical excuse given 
was that immigrants “are not used to tables and chairs and do not miss them when they are 
lacking.” Regulations enacted in 1907 -as part of the same law creating the U.S. Immigration 
Commission- increased passenger space requirements to a level beyond that specified in 1882 
but below what was already generally in effect.18 
 In general, inspections under the 1882 and 1907 acts had little lasting effect. As the 
Immigration Commission noted, a typical entry port inspector made only a “passing glance” 
over the vessel after it had been “prepared for his approval and not as it was in actual use.” U.S. 
government officials in charge of enforcing the acts were sympathetic to the steamship lines and 
reluctant to impose fines.19 Historians have generally agreed that legal regulations, though 
significant to other aspects of the European emigrants’ relocation, had comparatively little effect 
upon the pre-World War I Atlantic crossing. More often, they have ascribed improvements in 
oceanic travel conditions to competition between the various shipping companies, and attributed 
regional variation in on-board accommodations to discrimination between ethnicities or 
nationalities.20 These judgments seem plausible but leave key historical questions unanswered. 
Most particularly, why were the improvements slow to come, yet so clear and consistent as to 
amount to (where they did occur) a distinct “new” steerage? 
The Immigration Commission’s own explanation -that competition motivating 
improvements was sharply checked by cooperative agreements between the shipping lines- is 
highly doubtful. Market share quotas under these arrangements applied to steerage passengers 
only and were enforced by compensation payments (from overquota lines to underquota lines) 
that set an effective floor on ticket prices. Far from checking competition by quality 
enhancements, these conference contracts encouraged it, especially in the second class. This 
class was not subject to the market share agreements, was mainly occupied by migrants, and 
grew rapidly as a share of overall passenger volume during the period. Companies sometimes 
willingly exceeded their steerage shares anyway in advance of renegotiating for higher quotas. 
                                                
17 Dillingham Report vol. 37, pp. 5-6, Zolberg, pp. 105, 112-3, 146, 158. 
18 New York Tribune, 23 August 1905 (in National Archives Record Group 85, Entry 9, 51435/1 [Box 13]), for the 
quoted passage; see also Williams to Collector of the Port of New York Stranahan, 13 June 1904 (Ibid), New York 
Times, 15 December 1909, p. 3, New York Times, 30 November 1913, p. 10, Jones, p. 330, Dillingham Report, vol. 39, 
pp. 377-79. 
19 Dillingham Report, vol. 39, pp. 12-13; see also Jones, pp. 328-31. 
20 ARCN, 1906, p. 52, Moltmann, “Steamship Transport,” p. 312, Jones, p. 331, Aldcroft, p. 35; see also Nadell, p. 
277 (“economic competition, not legislative action”), and Maxtone-Graham, p. 28 (“market forces”) and p. 11 
(“calculated nationalistic double-standard”). Re transpacific travel, see the section “Migration and travel conditions 
between Asia and the United States…” below. 
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These market-carving cartels were generally relatively weak before 1904, quite weak during 1893 
to 1895, and again from mid-1904 to early 1908, from 1904 until 1908, and relatively strong after 
1908, yet this ebb and flow of cartel effectiveness shows no reflection (as the Commission’s 
theory might suggest) in the steadily upward (not up and down) trend of closed berths (Figure 2 
in the appendix).21 
Competition is a good reason for doubting whether shipping company prejudice against 
southern and eastern Europeans explains the slower diminution of discomforts on ships from 
those regions. Competition -without specification as to how and why it occurred- does not, 
however, satisfactorily explain the significant yet slow and uneven improvements that developed. 
It also does not account for why steerage in enclosed cabins (as compared to “old steerage” 
dormitories) was nearly always accompanied by better food, more and better public areas, and “a 
vast difference in discipline, service and general attitude” of crew members toward passengers.22 
Shipping lines, as several historians have noted, were not philanthropists, nor were they 
in business to discourage immigration of any particular ethnic group. To understand why profit-
seeking private enterprises improved conditions for the class of passengers sometimes referred 
to as self-loading freight, one needs to be more specific about how cross-Atlantic migration 
operated as a key segment of a huge, mature, concentrated and standardized long-distance 
transportation business.23 Because nearly all costs in this business were fixed (did not adjust up 
or down with revenue) a top priority was to optimally market and allocate available vessel space 
between three jointly carried revenue segments: tourist passengers on the top decks, freight on 
the lowest decks, and migrant passengers in between.24 
To economically operate large energy-efficient vessels required juggling the different 
needs of these three business sectors. Goods shipment was the most price-sensitive, and 
competition kept profit rates low on freight after 1900. The margin of ticket price above costs 
was higher in steerage than in first class. Improvements to the first class, however, brought 
prestige to the line and more passengers (including migrants), and tourist traffic fluctuated less 
than migration did.25 
The critical need to maximize capacity utilization encouraged interchangeability of ship 
sections between customer categories. Use of steerage for both migrants and freight, thought to 
be common on the much smaller sailing ships of the early nineteenth century, was very 
infrequent after 1890, mainly because the by then gigantic steamers had room enough in their 
cavernous holds below the steerage decks to accommodate freight shipment demands; and also, 
                                                
21 Aldcroft, p. 335, Murken, pp. 91, 113-6, Keeling, “Cartels,” pp. 195-213, Keeling, “Fare War,” pp. 359-60, 374, 
Broeze, pp 8-12. 
22 Dillingham Report, vol. 37, p. 12, Maxtone-Graham, p. 29. 
23 Moltmann, “Steamship Transport,” p. 312; Maxtone-Graham, p. 5. 
24 Maxtone-Graham, p. 2. Because over 90 percent of shipping line costs were fixed while average net profit 
margins were less than 10 percent of revenues, a small percentage change in fare-paying travellers translated into a 
much larger percentage change in earnings (Keeling, “Capacity,” p. 231). This amplified the impact of the wide 
fluctuations of migrant traffic upon shipping company earnings. 
25 Harley, pp. 1052-56, Keeling, “Capacity,” pp. 240-42, Maxtone-Graham, p. 24. Several smaller lines relying heavily 
on steerage went out of business when economic downturns in the United States drastically curtailed migration 
flows. Bonsor, pp. 234-35, 608, 706, 695, 712, 1190, 1232-33, 1348, 1371, 1378.  
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because heavy cargos on the lower levels were needed for vessel stability.26 Instead, shipping 
lines increasingly swapped capacity between tourists and migrants, and in two related ways. 
Tourists and migrants had somewhat offsetting seasonal movements. The flow of 
westbound migrants peaked in the late spring or early summer, roughly coinciding with the peak of 
U.S. tourists eastbound to Europe. By the 1890s, a rising percentage of shipping capacity devoted 
to the second class was being used interchangeably by both a subset of migrants willing to pay 
fares above than normal steerage rates, and a budget-conscious minority of tourists. An 
additional form of interchange was the temporary reallocation of rooms between second class 
and first class. Temporary reclassifications of rooms and upgrades for travellers were also 
possible between steerage and second, provided that the steerage units were closed berths (new 
steerage).27 
There is considerable evidence of these sorts of interchanges. Tourist traffic (and the 
associated revenue from first class passengers) was heaviest, and the interchange potential 
greatest, on the United Kingdom-United States routes, as Table 2 shows. This is a key reason 
why second class and closed-berth steerage grew most there, and ahead of other routes.28 
 
 
Table 2  Estimated Revenues by Class, European Port Region, 1900-1913 
 
 United Kingdom Cont. Med. All Regions 
     
First Class 46% 22% 12% 27% 
Second Class 22% 18% 6% 16% 
Steerage 32% 60% 82% 57% 
      100% 100% 100% 100% 
     Passengers (millions) 5.8 9.8 5.7  
 
Source: Passengers (in both directions, to and from the United States, and in all travel classes) from PCR multiplied 
 by fares estimated from sources in Keeling, “Capacity,” p. 272. 
 
Note: This encompasses passengers between Europe and New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, divided by 
region of European port: United Kingdom, North Continental and Scandinavia (Cont.), and Mediterranean (Med.). Note 
that many passengers embarking at U.K. ports were transit migrants from other regions of Europe. 
 
 
 Marketing considerations also encouraged provision of closed berths, especially on the 
U.K. routes. Migrants there were somewhat more experienced with amenities such as running 
water and dining tables. They travelled more often as families with children (preferring more 
private enclosed quarters) than did their Mediterranean contemporaries, who were more 
preponderantly young single males focused on maximizing savings from their American 
sojourns. Rates of repeat migration rose over the steamship era, and were higher from the British 
Isles and Scandinavia than from eastern and southern Europe. The typical repeat migrant 
                                                
26 Harley, pp. 1040-43, 1047, 1053. 
27 Keeling, “Transportation Revolution,” p. 50. 
28 Keeling, “Capacity,” pp. 238-39. 
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making a summer visit to relatives in northern Europe after several successful years in America, 
having prior experience at crossing the ocean and the financial means to pay above rock-bottom 
rates for a ticket, was considered to be more attuned to travel conditions than the first-time 
crosser, and better able to choose between competing lines.29 
With an average vessel life of about twenty-five years, the overall quality of onboard 
service for migrant travellers increased slowly, although retrofits of existing liners accelerated the 
process somewhat. By the end of the period, most migrants journeying between the British Isles 
and North America were lodged in cabins. The incidence of closed berths rose on the other 
routes as well, but with a considerable lag. 30 
 
 
Effects of travel improvements upon migration between Europe and the United 
States 
 
The reasons for improvements to travel conditions in ships crossing the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century North Atlantic are traceable within the actions of a dozen major 
shipping corporations. The impacts of those improvements upon transatlantic migration are 
more difficult to gauge because they were dispersed across the lives of millions of families. 
Emigrants’ own accounts say more about the hardships and hazards of living and working in a 
strange and distant land than about the short-term discomforts of getting there. After 1890, the 
groups with the highest emigration rates relative to source population -Italians, Poles, and 
Russian Jews- travelled overwhelmingly on oceanic routes where the ship improvements came 
relatively slowly.31  
Overall, improvements to oceanic travel conditions had little impact upon fundamental 
decisions about migrating or not migrating across the North Atlantic, but there is evidence for a 
moderate influence upon subsidiary decisions concerning how to move to America (from which 
European embarkation port) and how often to traverse the ocean (once or more than once). Most 
early twentieth century European emigrants had more than one possible route to America. To a 
limited extent, for instance, generally better new steerage in ships from British ports after 1900 
encouraged continental emigrants to travel go the United States through Britain.32 Many had more 
than one opportunity to relocate across the Atlantic. 
It seems likely that the substantial rise in the rate of repeat migration between Europe and 
America (to about 20 percent during 1910-1914 versus about 10 percent during the early 1890s) 
was not only a cause, but also to some degree an effect of trends toward less-objectionable travel 
conditions. Italian migrants were famously multiple crossers, and most -though not all- did so in 
old steerage. In fact, however, Italian immigrants to the United States overwhelmingly crossed 
the ocean only once (from Italy) or twice (from and back to Italy). Short-term visits back to 
                                                
29 Although more expensive, second class provided a better bargain relative to the service offered than steerage, 
especially open-berth steerage (Keeling, “Capacity,” pp. 240-42 and 258 n. 68, Nadell, p. 274).  
30 Keeling, “Capacity,” p. 232, Figure 2 below (Appendix). 
31 Amran, p. 35. Re regional incidence of closed berths, see Figure 2 (Appendix) below. 
32 Moltmann, “Risiko,” pp. 182-211, here p. 203, La Sorte, p. 19, Dillingham Report, vol. 37, pp. 26-27. 
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Europe by already successfully immigrated Europeans in the United States, who left from 
America temporarily, and then returned again later back again (thus making a total of three 
crossings or more, counting the initial westward move), were more prevalent among British and 
Scandinavians, and after about 1905-08 they mostly travelled in closed berths.33 Better-quality 
accommodations may also help explain a positive correlation between the proportion of second 
class and steerage offered as closed berths on vessels and the rate of eastward transits (all repeat) 
to westward transits (mostly first-time) transits on those vessels. Travel-quality inducements to 
repeat migration, however, had relatively little impact on migrants with minimal interest in ever 
moving back to Europe (regardless of travel conditions) such as most eastern European Jewish 
migrants. 34 
To quantitatively measure the effects of closed berths on migration volumes involves 
confronting several challenges: firstly, distinguishing decisions to migrate, or remigrate, from 
choice of route or vessel, secondly, isolating the role of accommodations quality from other 
(though related) factors such as the age and speed of the vessel, the perceived quality of the 
shipping line, the time of year, and motive for the journey etc., and thirdly, data on the portion 
of steerage provided as closed berths has so far been located from only about one third of vessel 
voyages to major U.S. Atlantic ports, 1900-14 (although these seem to be roughly representative 
in most respects).35  
An extensive statistical analysis lies beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, a 
database of voyages to and from those major ports -constructed for the broader research of 
transportation and migration processes- does enable indicative calculations.36 On eastward 
sailings during the spring (travelled on by relatively experienced repeat migrants returning to 
Europe for the summer), vessels with over a fifth of steerage quarters in closed berths had a 
higher average capacity utilization (28% versus 20%) than those with fewer than one in five 
steerage berths being in closed cabins. Ships with over 20% of steerage in closed berths were 
preferred by an even greater margin than this overall result suggests, moreover, because some of 
the vessels with more than a fifth of steerage in closed berths, such as those of the Holland 
America line, were relatively lightly travelled on for other reasons (slow speed, somewhat out-of-
the-way routing, etc.). Without those lightly-travelled-on vessels, the 28% result would be higher.  
                                                
33 Figure 2 (Appendix), below, Keeling, “Repeat,” p. 172, Keeling, “Capacity,” p. 283, Maxton-Graham, pp. 5-6, 11. 
Another reason for greater rates of repeat migration from northern Europe (compared to southern), was the large 
number of immigrants from northern Europe who had migrated to the United States already earlier in the 
nineteenth century, relative to new inflows after 1890 (Historical Statistics of the United States, pp. 1-560-1-562). 
34 Proportion of closed berths from Table 3 (Appendix) compared to passenger movements from PCR. See also 
note 36 below. Eastbound Europeans were more experienced travellers, having crossed the Atlantic at least once 
already. Ships with a high percentage of closed berths were also generally of more recent vintage, and migrants 
preferred modern vessels. (Keeling, “Transportation Revolution,” p. 53, Maxtone-Graham, p. 23).  
35 See table 3 (Appendix) below. 
36 The database covers voyages to and from New York, Boston, Philadephia and Baltimore from July 1899 through 
June 1914. See the notes to Figure 2 in the Appendix, and http://www.business-of-migration.com/data/voyage-
database/ . Capacity utilization is defined here as the percentage of pasenger berths that were occupied by 
passengers. The 28% utilization rate for ships with a known greater than 20% provision of closed berths in steerage 
reflects 319 thousand eastward steerage passengers embarking during the months of April, May and June, divided by 
a total capacity of 1,416 thousand eastward steerage berths, provided on 820 voyages of 40 vessels of 10 lines. See 
also, Keeling, “Capacity,” pp. 226, 232-40. 
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Migration and travel conditions between Asia and the United States: preliminary 
observations and comparative issues 
 
Crucial differences between transpacific and transatlantic relocation to the United States between 
1890 and 1914 may help explain why the improvement to travel conditions on the Pacific 
crossing lagged those on the Atlantic and had relatively less impact upon migration flows. 
Compared to American immigration from Europe in these years, immigration from Asia was 
much smaller (somewhat less than 2% as much), more restricted legally (Chinese Exclusion, first 
adopted in 1882, and Japanese Gentlemen’s agreement of 1907), and more compartmentalized 
(the largest two Pacific migration entry ports, Honolulu and San Francisco took about one-third 
each, versus New York with two-thirds of the Atlantic inflow), and the official number of 
arrivals was augmented by a larger related fraction of undocumented entries.37  
 The basic economic dynamics of the transoceanic passenger travel business were much 
the same on the two oceans. The vessels used were mostly large coal-fired steamships, many 
built in the same leading European or U.S. shipyards, high operating and capital costs of these 
ships were little affected by changes in revenues, regular schedules were essential, and managing 
capacity so as to efficiently and simultaneously handle migrants, non-migrants and freight cargos 
was crucial.38  
 Nonetheless, Robert Barde, in one of the so far most extensive historical analyses of 
Pacific steerage conditions, was “struck by the differences in accommodations between [cross-
Pacific] emigration ships and the passenger ships plying the North Atlantic.” On Canadian 
Pacific’s Abyssinia (1887), “in bad weather seas would break over the upper deck making it 
impossible for passengers to stay dry, there was no running water, no refrigeration, no steam 
heat.” Abyssinia had been built 17 years earlier for the Cunard Line’s service from Liverpool to 
New York. Running water for passengers was common on those routes by the 1870s, 
refrigeration had been introduced in the early 1880s, and steam-heating already in the 1850s. On 
the 1899 Nippon Maru, “surely the most splendid ship on the Pacific,” two-thirds of steerage 
accommodations were based on convertible “open deck space.” Open-berth steerage, Barde 
noted, remained common on transpacific passenger ships into the 1950s.39  
 On the transatlantic migration routes, the replacement of open-berth steerage by closed 
berthed second class and “new” steerage, correlates with the fraction of passengers who were 
                                                
37 Immigration by origin country, Historical Statistics of the United States, p. 1-556, by U.S. entry port, BI annual reports, 
1895-1914, Table 1. Undocumented and extra-legal migration are described, for Europe, in Dillingham Report, vol. 
1, p. 185, vol. 4, p. 119, BI Conditions, pp. 25-30 (chapter 2, section 1), BI annual reports, 1904, pp. 46-47, 77-82, 
103, 121, 1906, pp. 57, 1912, 206-09, Brandenburg, p. 36, La Sorte, pp. 31-36, and from Asia, Lee, “Borders,” p. 55, 
Barde, pp. 11-13, 128, and Takai, pp. 10-11. Despite clear incentives for it, undocumented flows of Asian migrants 
through Canada or Mexico were limited by the cost and difficulty of the multi-week Pacific crossing (for all 
migration, legal or otherwise). Furthermore, many restriction-evading entries were documented, albeit incorrectly or 
fraudulently, and restriction evasion was relatively greater at west coast ports, where tougher regulatory barriers 
applied. Some transpacific passengers also arrived as stowaways or through smugglers (e.g. see Barde, pp. 209-33). 
38 Barde, pp. 78-82, Keeling, “Transportation Revolution,” pp. 46-49, 52. 
39 Barde, p. 97 (quoting Robert Turner, The Pacific Empresses) and pp. 134-45, 184. Barde also mentions his reliance 
upon earlier stuides of Michio Yamada. See also Bonsor, pp. 151, 202 
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tourists and business travellers demanding closed cabins, e.g. quarters which during slack periods 
-at least at the low end of the price range- might also house migrants. The somewhat offsetting 
seasonal flow patterns of migrants and tourists thus enabled companies to boost overall capacity 
usage by using some closed berths interchangeably in one voyage direction for tourists and the 
other direction for migrants.40 On transatlantic voyages along routes out of the Mediterranean 
ports, through which transatlantic first class traffic was the least frequent, closed berths were 
slower to develop than on other routes (closed berths out of Mediterranean ports did not exceed 
5% of overall steerage41 until after 1910). In terms of travel conditions for migrant passengers, 
the Pacific routes were thus behind even the slowest-to-improve trans-North Atlantic corridor. 
This was, however, evidently due to some reason other than a low level of non-migrant traffic. 
In his analysis, Barde suggests that “Asians were more price-sensitive when it came to 
transoceanic travel. How else to explain that American and Japanese lines retained the concept 
of semi-open steerage [on the Pacific] so long after it went out of vogue on the Atlantic?”42 
 It does indeed seem highly likely that much of Asian emigration in this period was more 
sensitive to the prices of transoceanic tickets than its European counterpart was. A sizable 
minority of the emigration from China and Japan (and more than on contemporaneous 
migration from Europe) was financed or organized under contractual or quasi-contractual 
arrangements. To a middleman firm or employer in California or Hawaii the low importation 
cost of low-wage labor mattered more than the travel conditions experienced by the future 
laborers. Furthermore, even the larger fraction of transpacific migrants whose travel was self-
financed faced ticket prices and travel times nearly double those of the Atlantic traverse. Given 
the greater and more complex legal hurdles applied to Asian immigration, costs other than travel 
expenses were probably also considerably higher, on average, for transpacific migration travel.43 
 Nevertheless, it is doubtful that higher price sensitivity was the only factor impeding 
development of closed berths and associated travel improvements for transpacific migrants, or 
even the most important of multiple factors. Repeat and return migrants (more experienced with 
oceanic travel than first-timers, often better off financially, and generally better able to 
appreciate, afford and obtain more expensive closed berth accommodations) seem to have been 
at least as high relative to overall transpacific migration flows as on the Atlantic. Barde’s data 
analysis for 1913-19, corroborated by BI data for 1910-14, indicate a rate of migrant travel in 
cabin class (in excess of ten percent) that is also comparable to the transatlantic rates. At San 
Francisco, one of the two largest entry ports for immigration from Asia, a third of arriving 
passengers between 1890 and 1914 were recorded as being U.S. citizens. Given the then 
prevailing naturalization laws, most of these were probably not recent immigrants from Asia, and 
were probably passengers of some financial means (perhaps not unlike the tourists and business 
                                                
40 Thus, for instance, the closed berth second class cabin housing “upscale” European immigrants arriving in New 
York in late May, might, on the ship’s return trip to Europe in early June, then house “budget-minded” American 
tourists departing for European summer vacations. See Keeling, “Capacity, pp. 238-40.  
41 11% of steerage plus second class, see Figure 2 below (Appendix). 
42 Barde, p. 135. 
43 McKeown, pp. 239-91, Barde, pp. 80-89, Lee, “Gates,” pp. 111-45, Daniels, pp. 241-51, Takaki, pp. 209, 250, 
Keeling, “Transportation Revolution,” p. 50. 
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travellers on the Atlantic) who accordingly journeyed mainly in the cabin class (mostly in first 
cabin) not in steerage.44 Moreover, of “Aliens” departing from San Francisco to China and Japan 
during 1910-14, 25% travelled in the costlier cabin class rather than in steerage. This is higher 
than the 17% of “aliens in cabin” going from major U.S. Atlantic ports to Europe during those 
years.45 First class passengers were thus seem not to have been a lower percentage on the Pacific 
than on contemporaneous Atlantic-Mediterranean routes (see Figure 1); indeed they may have 
been almost up to the percentage levels of the (relatively high closed-berth steerage) U.K-to-U.S. 
corridor. 
 Furthermore, on the North Atlantic, price sensitivity had little inhibiting effect on 
improvements to travel conditions because the principal means of delivering the improvements -
increased offerings of closed-berth accommodations in steerage- was provided to migrants at little, or 
more often no, extra charge.46 Passengers’ decision-making based more on travel costs can logically 
explain why transpacific steam companies were reluctant to charge a higher fare for better travel 
accommodations within the same basic travel class. It cannot explain the Pacific companies, in 
contrast to their transatlantic counterparts, not offering improved steerage accommodations at 
unchanged prices. For that explanation, a closer look at the structural conditions in the early twentieth 
century oceanic passenger steamship business is useful. 
 Compared to the North Atlantic, passenger shipping to and from the United States across the 
North Pacific seems to have been on a lower scale relative to the volume of travel, with less inter-firm 
competition and less concentration of the traffic. Instead of one big port, comparable to the Atlantic’s 
New York, the Pacific had three (San Francisco, Seattle, and, after the Hawaiian annexation, 
Honolulu). Instead of luxury class traffic being overwhelming dominated by long-standing and 
strongly seasonal tourist travellers, as on the Atlantic, the upper ticket price customers on the Pacific 
were a more diffuse (and probably less seasonal) mixture of businessmen, diplomats and missionaries. 
Such differences reduced the scope and incentives, on the Pacific, for sharing closed berths between 
migrants and non-migrants in order to increase capacity utilization.47  
 Vessels on the transpacific migration routes seem to have averaged about half the size of their 
transatlantic counterparts.48 This would not, per se, have hindered the provision of closed berths to 
the migrant travel segment, but it suggests that the Pacific, in general, lagged the Atlantic in terms of 
realizing scale economies in passenger ships and associated possibilities for passing along engine 
efficiencies to the customers by increasing average on-board space available per passenger.  
                                                
44 Barde, p. 134, .S. Bureau of Immigration, annual reports, “Passengers departed…”[BI Departures], 1910-14. The 
1870 Naturalization Act is described briefly by Daniels, p. 245. 
45 Table 2 above, BI Departures. See also Takaki, pp. 194, 255. 
46 Dillingham Report, p. 37, pp. 31-32. 
47 Keeling, “Capacity,” BI Departures, Auslin, p. 19. 
48 The 6 thousand ton Nippon Maru was, upon its first U.S. arrival in 1899, “the largest passenger ship to have 
entered” the port of San Francisco. Nippon Maru was a little more than one third the size of the 17 thousand ton 
Oceanic of 1899, the North Atlantic’s biggest in 1899, and could carry about half as many migrants -depending on 
how its “open deck space” convertible to steerage is counted (Barde, p. 184 Bonsor, p. 760). Manchuria and Mongolia 
of 1904, said to be the then largest on the Pacific, had, at just under 14 thousand tons, and with 1450 steerage 
berths, about half the capacity of the biggest Atlantic vessel that year, White Star’s Baltic (Bonsor, pp. 763, 1094-95). 
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 Competition between migrant-carrying steamship lines, especially including competition 
on travel conditions,49 was less pronounced on the North Pacific than on the North Atlantic. 
Almost all migrants returning to Europe embarked at New York. From there, most of these 
relatively experienced repeat migrant crossers (who were also relatively sensitive to travel 
conditions) generally had a readily apparent choice of both routes and lines. The North Atlantic 
passenger cartel agreements were furthermore relatively weak with respect to eastbound traffic 
to Europe. From the key Pacific port, San Francisco, in contrast, there was but one line each to 
China and Japan for most of the period, and the two transport companies together had a 
relatively strong cartel deal between them.50 Competition between lines was also limited at other 
major Pacific ports (two carriers in Honolulu, three in Seattle), and the migrant travel market was 
further segmented due to reliance on stage migration (e.g. through Hawaii), transit migration 
(e.g. through Canada), differential regulation and the various forms of evading it, and in some 
instances separate, racially-segregated, travel sections on the ships.51 
 There is also likely to have been some gradual overall improvement, over time, in travel 
conditions within open-berth steerage on transpacific routes. This might have been comparable, if 
somewhat lagging behind, contemporaneous improvements on the Mediterranean-to-U.S. 
corridor that were encouraged, in part, by Italian and U.S. regulatory stipulations and 
administration.52 Such regulations, however, had more to do with eligibility for relocation than 
with conditions of the transit. It is doubtful whether official legal intervention (for instance, of 
Italy or Japan), that was directly applicable to travel conditions, had effects comparable to the 
movement towards closed berth steerage on board vessels voyaging from northern Europe, e.g., 
the “New Steerage” improvements on the Atlantic crossing that were mainly motivated by 
capacity management, risk management and non-price competition considerations of the main 
steamship lines themselves. Relatively low demand, among ticket price-focused Asian 
immigrants, for relatively less uncomfortable on-board accommodations (in a more expensive 
cabin class of travel), certainly seems to have been less significant than supply-side factors in 
constraining improvements to transpacific steerage conditions. 
 These are tentative results that raise further questions. To reach firmer conclusions, one 
would need more qualitative and quantitative information on transpacific travel conditions and 
on the migrants experiencing them in the years before the First World War. For instance: what 
portion of cabin accommodations was in a utilitarian “intermediate” or “second class” affordable 
to successful but not wealthy migrants or repeat migrants, and how did these accommodations 
change over time?  
                                                
49 As noted already above, commercial contractors who organized much of the Asian migration, are likely to have 
sometimes preferred one shipping line over another based on ticket price, but not based, for instance, on the 
amount of on-board space, degree of privacy or quality of food served to migrant passengers.  
50 Passenger volume data based on PCR, BI Departures, cartel agreements described in Keeling, “Fare War,” pp. 
359-63, 374, and Deltas, et. al., pp. 30-32. Unlike in Europe, where migrants embarked from many different ports, 
nearly 90 percent of second and steerage passengers traveling to Europe from the United States left from New York, 
and many of the shipping lines had their offices on the same street block in Manhattan (Keeling, “Capacity,” p. 252 
n. 28, Feys, pp. 43-45). 
51 Daniels, pp. 250-54, Barde, pp. 83-84, 98. 
52 Italian Emigration Act of 1901. 
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 Travel conditions, and their causes and effects, evolved over time on both oceans, along 
with technological developments in shipping, changes in labor markets, and shifting government 
regulations, and at a pace constrained by the roughly ten-year turnover time for vessel 
replacements within the shipping lines’ fleets. The conversion from open to closed berths on the 
North Atlantic happened in two basic, though overlapping, stages: (1) the expansion of the 
intermediate second class capacity relative to both first class and steerage (starting in the 1880s and 
continuing thereafter), and (2) ongoing increases in the percentage of steerage berths that were 
closed instead of open. Before 1914, the transpacific lines evidently did not progress much 
beyond stage 1. Return and repeat moves were significant sub-components of the overall mass 
migration across both oceans, and clearly tied to the migrant kinship networks and labor market 
opportunities propelling foreigners to both North American coasts. In contrast to the movement 
between Europe and America, however, return and repeat migration of Asians was clearly 
associated much more with regulatory constraints than with oceanic travel conditions.53 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The complex of influences shaping and altering the transoceanic travel experiences of American 
immigrants, in the quarter century prior to the First World War, was an important element of the 
processes through which this powerful instance of modern globalization occurred. 
Governmental investigation and public regulation had relatively minor effects on the travel 
conditions experienced by European migrants crossing the North Atlantic in the early twentieth 
century. The business calculus of the oceanic transporters enabling this mass intercontinental 
population transfer played a more significant role. 
After 1890, a growing minority of transatlantic migrants travelled in closed berths. These 
particularly appealed to repeat migrants able and willing to pay a premium for such improved 
accommodations, especially in second class, which was not governed by cartel volume quotas, 
and thus was offered at only a relatively small premium over steerage fares. More importantly, 
the relative growth of both second-class and closed-berth steerage reflected the interest of 
shipping lines in passenger quarters interchangeably housing migrants and tourists. Such 
interchanges were most common on routes from the British Isles, which were most heavily used 
by tourists. Repeat migration was also heaviest on the United Kingdom-United States routes. 
Along with the late-nineteenth-century growth of temporary employment opportunities in the 
United States and reduced travel times (more on land than on sea), improved travel conditions 
were probably partly responsible for making migration travel, after 1890, more often circular, 
and less often the one-time ordeal at least stereotypically associated with the sailing ship era. 
Across Pacific routes to America, a significant incidence of repeat and return crossings largely 
reflected legal restrictions against mass one-way movement. The relative absence of such legal 
constraint upon Atlantic crossings before 1914 thus enabled a greater role for travel conditions 
to shape the pattern and flows of transatlantic mass migration to and from the United States. 
                                                
53 Keeling, “Capacity,” pp. 232, 240, “Repeat,” pp. 170-75, Barde, pp. 79-81. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
 Table 3    Ships in service between Europe and major U.S. ports, 1900-14, 
                   with percentages of steerage capacity in closed berths 
  
Region Ship Line Year 
Gross  
tons 
Steerage  
capacity 
% 
Closed Source 
                
UK Umbria Cunard 1884 8,128 800 6 %  Gibbs, p. 538 
UK Etruria Cunard 1885 8,120 800 6 %  Gibbs, p. 538 
UK Friesland American 1889 7,116 800 0 %  deck plans 
UK Campania Cunard 1893 12,950 1000 12 %  deck plans 
UK Lucania Cunard 1893 12,952 1000 14 %  deck plans  
UK Oceanic White Star 1899 17,272 1000 25 %  Taylor, p. 157 
UK Teutonic White Star 1899 9,984 1000 10 %  NY Trib, 21-May-03, p. 9 
UK Ultonia Cunard 1899 8,845 675 0 %  Taylor, p. 161 
UK Ivernia Cunard 1900 14,066 1800 100 %  Bost, 14-Dec-09, p. 4 
UK Saxonia Cunard 1900 14,281 1800 100 %  Bost, 14-Dec-09, p. 4 
UK Celtic White Star 1901 20,904 2350 36 %  Taylor, p. 157 
UK Haverford American 1901 11,635 1700 10 %  deck plans 
UK Cedric White Star 1903 21,035 2000 48 %  deck plans 
UK Majestic * White Star 1903 10,147 800 75 %  NY Trib, 21-May-03, p. 9 
UK Merion American 1903 11,621 1700 10 %  deck plans 
UK Baltic White Star 1904 23,876 2000 48 %  Est. from Isherwood (1976), p. 507. 
UK Carmania Cunard 1905 19,524 2000 53 %  deck plans  
UK Caronia Cunard 1905 19,678 2000 53 %  deck plans  
UK Adriatic White Star 1907 24,541 2000 42 %  Taylor, p. 157 
UK Lusitania Cunard 1907 31,550 1138 100 %  McCart, p. 57 
UK Mauretania Cunard 1907 31,937 1138 100 %  McCart, p. 73 
UK Cameronia Anchor 1911 10,963 802 29 %  L'pool Jrl, 29-May-11 
UK Franconia Cunard 1911 18,149 1900 100 %  Bost, 27-Apr-11, p. 4 
UK Olympic White Star 1911 45,324 1026 84 %  Isherwood (1956), p. 105 
UK Laconia Cunard 1912 18,099 1900 100 %  Bost, 27-Apr-11, p. 4 
UK New York * American 1913 10,499 725 21 %  BI Cond, pp. 112-13 
UK Andania Cunard 1913 13,405 1540 100 %  Isherwood (1974), pp. 321-23 
UK Alaunia Cunard 1914 13,405 1540 100 %  Isherwood (1974), pp. 321-23 
UK Aquitania Cunard 1914 45,647 2052 93 %  Isherwood (1974), p. 73 
        
        
Region Ship Line Year 
Gross 
Tons 
Steerage  
capacity 
% 
Closed  Source 
                
Cont Spaarndam  Holland America 1881 4,539 800 10 %  deck plans 
Cont Karlsruhe NDL 1889 5,057 1955 0 %  deck plans 
Cont Stuttgart NDL 1890 5,048 1955 0 %  deck plans 
Cont Rotterdam (III) Holland America. 1897 8,302 2000 20 %  deck plans 
Cont Maasdam Holland America 1899 3,984 800 0 %  VoorTech 
Cont Statendam Holland America 1899 10,491 2000 25 %  VoorTech 
Cont Potsdam Holland America 1900 12,606 1914 39 %  VoorTech 
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Region Ship Line Year 
Gross 
Tons 
Steerage 
capacity 
% 
Closed Source 
                
Cont Rijndam Holland America 1901 12,340 1800 22 %  VoorTech, BI Cond, pp. 127-29  
Cont Noordam  Holland America 1902 12,531 1800 22 %  VoorTech, BI Cond, pp. 127-29  
Cont Amerika HAPAG 1905 22,225 2190 10 %  Kludas, p. 56  
Cont K. Aug Viktoria HAPAG 1906 24,581 2046 10 %  Kludas, p. 56  
Cont La Provence CGT 1906 13,753 948 33 %  deck plans 
Cont Nieuw Amsterdam Holland America 1906 16,967 2300 52 %  Voor Tech 
Cont President Grant HAPAG 1907 18,072 3006 23 %  Bonsor, p. 413  
Cont President Lincoln HAPAG 1907 18,168 3088 26 %  Bonsor, p. 413  
Cont Chicago CGT 1908 10,501 1250 22 %  Barbance, p. 162, Bonsor, pp. 660-61 
Cont Gothland * Red Star 1908 7,755 1800 100 %  Bonsor, p. 842 
Cont Rotterdam (IV) Holland America 1908 24,149 2232 52 %  Voor Tech 
Cont Russia RusAm 1908 8,596 1626 13 %  Bonsor, p. 1355 
Cont Cincinnati HAPAG 1909 16,339 2305 21 %  Bonsor, p. 414 
Cont Cleveland HAPAG 1909 16,960 2391 21 %  Bonsor, p. 413 
Cont George Washington NDL 1909 25,570 2000 31 %  Isherwood (1966 book), p. 48 
Cont Kursk RusAm 1910 7,858 1288 13 %  Bonsor, p. 1356  
Cont Rochambeau CGT 1911 12,678 1700 15 %  Barbance, p. 162, Bonsor, pp. 660-61 
Cont Czar RusAm 1912 6,503 1086 13 %  Bonsor, p. 1356  
Cont Bergensfjord Norw. Am. 1913 10,666 850 88 %  Kolltveit, pp. 36-37 
Cont Imperator HAPAG 1913 52,117 2714 35 %  Bonsor, p. 415  
Cont Kristianiafjord Norw. Am. 1913 10,669 850 88 %  Kolltveit, pp. 36-37 
Cont K. W. d. Grosse * NDL 1914 13,592 2130 30 %  Est. from Bonsor, p. 560 
Cont Vaterland HAPAG 1914 54,282 2386 36 %  Bonsor, p. 415 
        
Region Ship Line 
   
Year 
Gross 
Tons 
Steerage  
capacity 
% 
Closed Source 
                
Med Hamburg HAPAG 1900 10,523 1780 4 %  Isherwood (1981), p. 158 
Med Prinzess Irene NDL 1900 10,881 1954 0 %  BI Cond, p. 130 
Med Perugia Anchor 1901 4,348 1200 0 %  BI Cond, p. 117 
Med Carpathia Cunard 1903 13,555 1500 100 %  McCart, p. 42 
Med Republic White Star 1903 15,378 2508 20 %  BI Cond, p. 109 
Med Pannonia Cunard 1904 9,851 2066 0 %  McCart, p. 38 
Med Slavonia Cunard 1904 10,606 1954 0 %  McCart, p. 39 
Med Kaiser Franz Josef Austro-Am. 1912 12,567 1230 19 %  NY Times, 9-Jun-12, p. 11 
 
 
Sourc e s:  “Gross tons” and “Steerage capacity” are from Bonsor. “Year” is the first year for which the closed berth 
percentage applies. Usually this is the first year of vessel service, but sometimes (noted with *) it is the year of a 
retrofit. Sources for the closed berth percentages are Barbance, Boston Evening Transcript [Bost], BI Conditions [BI 
Cond], Gibbs, Holland America Line, Isherwood, Kludas, Kolltveit, Liverpool Journal of Commerce [L’pool Jrl], McCart, 
New York Times [NY Times], New York Tribune [NY Trib], Taylor, Voornaamste Technische Gegevens 
(Gemeentearchief, Rotterdam) [VoorTech]. For deck plans, see Keeling, “Capacity,” p. 264. 
 
Not es : Cont. = North Continental and Scandinavian ports, Med = Mediterranean ports, HAPAG = Hamburg-
Amerikanische Paketfahrt Aktiengesellschaft (Hamburg-American Line), CGT = French Line; RusAm = Russian-
American Line, NDL = Norddeutscher Lloyd (North German Lloyd), Norw. Am. = Norwegian-American Line, 
Austro-Am. = Austro-American Line. Dates of newspaper article sources abbreviated (e.g., 9-Jun-12 means 9 June 
1912). 
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Sources: Table 3 (Appendix), Bonsor, PCR. 
 
Notes: The figure is based on voyages (divided by port embarkation into three European regions, plus the total for all 
regions) to and from the four largest U.S. ports (New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore). Ninety-nine percent 
of migrants from Europe to the United States between 1899 and 1914 travelled through those four U.S. ports (PCR 
data). Second-class and steerage passengers between Europe and those four ports made twenty million crossings 
during these sixteen years on eighteen thousand voyages of 487 vessels supplying a cumulative total carrying capacity 
of fifty-two million passengers in second class and steerage. Breakdowns of steerage capacity between open and closed 
berth have been discovered for the sixty-seven passenger vessels shown in Table 3 (Appendix). These sixty-seven 
accounted for 28 percent of the voyages, 35 percent of the carrying capacity, and 36 percent of the passengers on 
these routes. On these sixty-seven vessels, the incidence of closed berths rose from 35 percent in 1899 to 54 percent 
in 1914 -that is, they were at a higher level than the overall averages estimated here, because large modern express 
steamers, and steamers on United Kingdom-United States routes, both with higher-than-average rates of closed 
berths, are disproportionately represented among these sixty-seven vessels. The chart here thus reflects trends on 
these sixty-seven vessels plus estimates for the other vessels based on qualitative statements in the contemporary and 
historical literature. Second class had only closed berths (of second class and steerage closed berths together, in 1899, 
56 percent were in second, in 1914, 41 percent). Steerage was partly closed (9 percent of all steerage in 1899, 24 
percent in 1914). First class accommodations were also exclusively closed berths, but very few migrants travelled in 
first class. See also Keeling, “Capacity,” especially p. 248 n. 8, p. 255 n. 56.  
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